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FOR PUBLIC POLICY

The Effects of Legislative Term Limits in Arizona

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Executive Summary

This paper, drawing upon historical data and information from surveys and interviews with more than 50 legislators, lobbyists, and knowledgeable observers, finds that the term limits reform adopted by the Arizona voters in 1992 has caused legislators to make some painful adjustments. Because of term limits many legislators have decided to run for another office prior to the expiration of their terms. This has often meant trying to move from the one legislative house to another, most commonly from the House to the Senate. On the plus side, the report finds that term limits have encouraged greater competition for legislative and other seats and have given voters a greater choice among candidates. To some extent, limits have been a force toward a more inclusive governing process. At the same time, they have generally reduced the power of legislative leaders and generally increased the influence of lobbyists and staff, though not all lobbyists and staff have gained equally. Recent newcomers to the Arizona Legislature are probably not any less knowledgeable than previous classes of newcomers, but under term limits there are more newcomers and members have less time to learn their jobs. For many, the limit to four two-year terms (eight years total) provides too little time to learn how to do the job and do it well.

The Effects of Legislative Term Limits in Arizona

Since 1966 — the year the “one person, one vote” standard forced a change in its structure — the Arizona Legislature has consisted of a 60-member House and a 30-member Senate. Under the plan, voters in each of 30 legislative districts elect two representatives and one senator for two-year terms. The Arizona Constitution imposes the same age, citizenship, and residency qualifications on House and Senate members.¹ In 1992, Arizona voters approved a constitutional amendment limiting individuals to four consecutive two-year terms in either the House or Senate, though allowing term limits to start over if a member moves to another chamber. The measure also “term limited” members of the U.S. Congress and top elected state officials. However, the U.S. Supreme Court later voided the provisions of the law relating to Congress.²

This paper, drawing upon a wide range of materials — including over 50 interviews with legislators, lobbyists, and observers — offers some tentative conclusions concerning the actual and likely, intended and unintended, effects of the term limits law.³ The following section discusses the nature and adoption of the reform and how, in general terms, it has blended in with developments in regard to legislative elections and the operation of the legislature. Following this largely historical account are sections offering a more definitive examination of the electoral and institutional effects of the reform.

Term Limits in the Flow of Events

Seventy-four percent of those who voted on the term limit proposal in 1992 voted in favor of it. Much of the vote may well have reflected unhappiness with the U.S. Congress. Much too, though, seems to have reflected discontent with Arizona politicians, and state legislators in particular. Arizona’s legislative term limit law came at a time when public confidence in the legislature had sunk to what could well have been an all time low. The effects of term limits were felt before 2000, when it first prevented a group of legislators from running for re-election. After the 2000 general election, the impact of the reform was magnified.

Adoption of the Measure

Arizona in the late 1980s and early 1990s had its share of political embarrassments. In the late 1980s, Governor Evan Mecham was attacked on various grounds through a recall campaign, court action, and impeachment proceedings. In 1988, after a long and bitter battle, the House impeached Mecham and the Senate ousted him from office for misusing public funds and obstructing justice. Three years later, a Phoenix Police Department sting operation, later known as AzScam, led to the indictment of seven state legislators for accepting bribes from an undercover agent posing as a gaming consultant trying to enlist support for casino gambling in the state. Not surprisingly, surveys following AzScam showed that more than 70 percent of the Arizonans polled agreed that Arizona lawmakers are too close to special-interest groups and that many legislators would accept a bribe if they thought they could get away with it.⁴

Following AzScam, legislators attempted to restore the image of the institution by making a series of reforms. In a special session they even toyed with the idea of putting a term limit measure on the ballot but ultimately failed to do so. However, a citizen’s organization known as the Arizona Coalition for Limited Terms (ACLT) took up the cause through an initiative campaign. Business

and anti-tax groups played prominent rolls in ACLT. A citizen's group formed earlier to push for Congressional term limits also joined the coalition. ACLT's drive led to the term limit law being approved by voters in 1992. Reflecting their broader distrust of the legislature, voters in 1992 also approved a measure that required legislators to come up with a two-thirds vote to increase taxes or other state revenue.

Developments: 1993-2000

Republicans generally dominated the 1992 election. They retained control of the House with a 35-25 edge and won back the Senate, which they had lost two years earlier by an 18–12 margin. At the beginning of the 1993 session, legislative leaders noted that voter approval of the term limits measure reflected strong public support for the idea of a citizen legislature. Leaders voiced their commitment to this concept and, in this spirit, vowed to complete the work of the legislature in 100 days so that legislators could go back to their homes and businesses as soon as possible.⁵

Over the next several years, legislators from the Republican party's right wing held most of the leadership positions and, working with a like-minded Republican governor, set off to implement a conservative agenda which was highlighted by a series of tax cuts. For much of this period moderate Republicans and Democrats in the legislature were shut out of the process. There were, however, several instances of rebellion within the Republican Party that one can partially attribute to term limits. One of the most publicized of these came in 1999 with a revolt by a group of approximately 16 moderate House Republicans who became known as the "Mushroom Coalition" because they felt they were being "kept in the dark and covered with bull." Coalition members, including a number of freshmen, were especially unhappy about having had no input into the budget — which, they charged, was made behind closed doors by a few legislative leaders and the governor.

One of the movement's leaders credited term limits for making first term lawmakers more aggressive. She felt that because they had only eight years in the House, they were much more eager to get things done and didn't want to be left out.⁶ Another coalition member added: "Because of term limits, we know we have to act sooner and take risks.... They have liberated us. The speaker will be gone in a year. He can't put me in the doghouse for the next 10 years."⁷ Still another rebel commented: "I was pleased to see the overall freshman class take an active role in the legislative process, especially on the budget. I believe this will become the norm because term limits compel members to 'make their mark' on public policy from the first day they are in office."⁸

Term limits began to have other effects as the 2000 election neared. In some cases, it was forcing legislators who had been serving since 1993 reluctantly to think about opportunities to move on prior to the expiration of their term. One example was long-time House Minority Leader Art Hamilton, who could have served until 2000, but decided in 1998 to run for Secretary of State. He lost in the general election.⁹ In the 1998 election, as detailed below, the term limits law may have had the effect of reducing competition for legislative seats because it encouraged potential candidates to put off their campaigns until 2000, a time when there would be more open seats.

Along with affecting elections, some observers saw term limits making a difference in how legislators went about their business. The Senate president noted at the start of the 2000 session, for example, that lawmakers were trying to be influential earlier in their terms by vying for

committee chairmanships and trying to climb into leadership posts.¹⁰ Later on, an example of defiance of leadership — partially attributed by some to term limits — occurred during a special session. Then, five Republican senators — three of whom were term limited and one who was voluntarily retiring — broke with their leaders and signed a discharge petition to bring an education spending measure out of a committee and onto the floor for a vote.¹¹

Term Limits Take Hold

By the time the 2000 election came around, the legislature had experienced another embarrassment, one which became popularly known as the “alternative fuels fiasco.” This involved legislation, hastily passed at the insistence of House Speaker Jeff Groscost in the spring of 2000, that provided large tax rebates to purchasers of alternative fuel vehicles. As originally adopted, the law rebated the entire cost of converting a car or truck to run on natural gas or propane and a third of the vehicle’s price. Lawmakers, however, acting hastily and without full information, underestimated how many people would take advantage of the program. As more and more people — more than 20,000 in all — chose the incentives, the original estimated costs to the state of \$3 million (the legislature’s estimate) or \$10 million (the governor’s estimate) rose to over \$500 million. A poll taken in the wake of the alternative fuels episode showed strong public dissatisfaction with the legislature — 52 percent of those surveyed thought the legislators were incompetent, 70 percent said they acted on impulse rather than deep reflection, and 68 percent felt they were an embarrassment to the state.¹² Aided by the alternative fuels fiasco, the election of 2000 produced a 33 percent turnover in the Senate and a 45 percent turnover in the House, the largest since the 48 percent produced in part by the AzScam scandal in 1992.

Term limits directly contributed to the turnover in 2000 by preventing 22 legislators, seven in the Senate and 15 in the House, from running for re-election. Several of the term limited publicly voiced their unhappiness with the law. One legislator who was forced out of the Senate told reporters he would have been more than willing to run again for his old seat and wished that term limits did not exist. He considered a run for Congress, but decided to take the unusual but far safer step of running for the House in 2000. He wound up winning the House seat.¹³ Matters did not turn out so well for a term limited House member who, declaring “I’m not willing to give up my career,” decided to take the unusual step of challenging an incumbent Senator from his own party.¹⁴ He lost to the incumbent in a primary battle. Throughout the state, term limits produced spirited primary fights. In one Republican primary, nine candidates fought it out for two open House seats. In three cases where incumbents were forced out by term limits, they were replaced by a relative — a wife, brother, and son — keeping the offices in the family.

Republicans retained control of the House in 2000 but a 15-15 party split in the Senate led to an unusual governing coalition as moderate Republicans and Democrats joined hands in a power sharing arrangement under which Republican Randall Gnant of Scottsdale became Senate president and Republicans and Democrats split committee chairmanships. Conservative Republicans reportedly were relatively isolated and a bit unhappy. One said he would not run again because the Senate was no longer a good place to work — it had become a place lacking in courtesy and mutual respect.¹⁵ Matters initially became a bit more chaotic in the House than in the past because of all the newcomers. One veteran legislator noted that the newcomers were unprepared to do the work of the veterans they replaced: “They’re lost, quite frankly.”¹⁶

In the 2002 election, term limits along with redistricting contributed to an historic legislative

turnover of close to 60 percent in both houses. Term limits directly ousted 15 members, six in the Senate and nine in the House. This number included the Senate president, the House speaker, the House majority and minority floor leaders, and the chairs of the Appropriations Committees in both houses. The chair of the House Appropriations Committee later remarked: “I wanted to stay, but I didn’t have a choice.”¹⁷ She saw no alternative but to challenge a popular senatorial incumbent — a contest she lost.

Republicans retained control of the House and recaptured the Senate in 2002, ending the coalition in the latter body that had governed in 2001-2002. The leadership of both legislative bodies became more conservative. In the 2003 legislative session, however, Republicans split once again, with several rebels leading the way in the Senate and another “Mushroom”-type rebellion emerging in the House. A group of 20 or so Republican newcomers, both conservatives and moderates, led the uprising in the House. The rebels were initially inclined to go along with leadership, but, as the session progressed, resented being shut out by legislative leaders when it came to making the budget. One participant remarked: “The budget is the most important thing we do at the legislature.... We can’t just sit back and let it happen without having an impact.”¹⁸ The dissident Republicans, called themselves the “Cellar Dwellers” because they met in the House basement.

Legislative leaders had given several of the newcomers what appeared to be important committee assignments, in part, because there was a shortage of experienced members to fill them. Newcomers later complained, however, that these positions actually gave them little power because the important decisions were being made elsewhere. In the House, a newcomer serving as vice chair of the Appropriations Committee could not even get into the meetings where budget issues were being handled. The Cellar Dwellers became more assertive on the budget, demanding and securing more information. One Democratic House member noted at the time: “This group is more in a hurry, wants to influence the action, and is not willing to blindly follow leaders or vote for something they don’t understand simply because leaders want it.” A long-time observer noted that although freshmen in the Arizona Legislature had always complained about being left out, the Cellar Dwellers seemed particularly anxious to get involved in a meaningful way. Legislative leaders were not prepared for freshmen being so assertive and linked the rebellion, in part, to term limits.

While the Cellar Dwellers ultimately made only a minimal impact on the budget in 2003, the rebellion seems to have loosened up the budgeting process the following year, as leaders brought more rank and file Republicans into the process through the formation of study groups. The majority leader announced that this step was a result of calls from other Republicans to be more involved. He partially attributed these calls for reform to term limits.¹⁹ Although House leaders moved toward more inclusiveness, they also demonstrated a “get-tough” stance with dissidents. In February 2004, for example, Speaker of the House Jake Flake took the unusual step of stripping two moderate Republicans of their committee chairmanships for defying leadership on a measure regarding Child Protective Services. In spite of this action, moderate Republicans once more rebelled against House leadership in a dispute over budgetary matters in 2004.

Historically, as the above discussion suggests, term limits have prompted legislators to make difficult decisions regarding their political careers and have directly and indirectly contributed to legislative turnover. Term limits too have played a role in how legislators have shaped their

legislative careers and how rank and file members relate to leadership. The following sections, drawing upon interview, survey, and statistical information, elaborate on these and related electoral and institutional effects.

Electoral Effects

In evaluating the electoral effects of term limits, we are generally concerned with how they have impacted legislative turnover, competition for legislative and other offices, the composition of the legislature, and the relationships between legislators and their constituents.

Turnover

Arizona has long been characterized by relatively frequent turnover among legislators, often from 20 to 30 percent. In recent years, thanks at least in part to term limits, the rate generally has been rising. Thus far, term limits have directly contributed to turnover by forcing 37 Arizona legislators out of office – 22 of these were forbidden from running for re-election in 2000 and 15 from running for re-election in 2002. Public statements, some of which were noted above, and interviews conducted for this study suggest that most of the term limited legislators would have been more than willing to run for re-election had they been given the chance. In addition, interviews and published reports indicate that term limits have played an important part in encouraging some, perhaps many, legislators to leave office prior to the expiration of their term in an effort to take advantage of an opportunity to continue their political careers elsewhere.²⁰

Thus far, term limits have directly prevented about 30 percent of the legislators subject to the law – that is, 37 of 122 legislators in the combined “freshman classes” of 1993 and 1995 – from seeking re-election to either the Senate or the House. This is perhaps a bit low considering the expectations of term limits proponents and their assumptions about the extent to which legislators cling to their offices, but not particularly shocking when one considers the legislature’s turnover history. The figures also suggest that their ability to move from one house to another has enabled several legislators to put in a full eight years of continuous legislative service and still avoid term limits. Fourteen House members of the freshman classes of 1993 and 1995 were able to do this by moving to the Senate prior to the expiration of their House term. Because of this, while close to half of all House members in these freshman classes served eight years in the legislature, only about 30 percent of them were term limited. Looking just at the 37 who have been forced out, members representing Pima County (Tucson) have suffered the most from term limits. Though the differences are not very pronounced, term limits have also affected senators more than representatives, Republicans more than Democrats, and males more than females.

Table 1
Legislative Turnover since 1981*
(Percent)

Year(s)	House	Senate
1981-1990	25	23
1990	25	33
1992	48	37
1994	35	33
1996	32	37
1998	25	23
2000	45	33
2002	58	60

*Measurement made by checking the rosters at the beginning of the first session immediately after an election.

Source: Gary Moncrief, Richard Niemi and Lynda Powell. 2004. “Time, Term Limits, and Turnover,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* (Forthcoming).

Table 2
Effects of Term Limits on Legislators Serving in the
Freshman Classes of 1993 and 1995
(Percentages of Total in Parenthesis)

Item	Total Number	Served All Eight Years in One or Both Houses	Served All Eight Years but Moved to the Other House	Served All Eight Years in Same House (term limited)
Total Members	122 (100%)	51 (42%)	14 (11%)	37 (30%)
House Members	82 (67%)	38 (46%)	14 (17%)	24 (29%)
Senate Members	40 (33%)	13 (33%)	0 (0%)	13 (33%)
Republicans	77 (63%)	31 (40%)	6 (17%)	25 (32%)
Democrats	45 (37%)	20 (44%)	8 (18%)	12 (27%)
Male	79 (65%)	33 (42%)	8 (10%)	25 (32%)
Female	43 (35%)	18 (42%)	6 (14%)	12 (28%)
Maricopa County	77 (63%)	29 (38%)	8 (10%)	21 (27%)
Pima County	21 (17%)	14 (67%)	4 (19%)	10 (48%)
Rural Counties	24 (20%)	8 (33%)	2 (8%)	6 (25%)

Source: David Berman, Ph.D., Morrison Institute for Public Policy, 2004.

In a broad perspective the term limit law has succeeded not so much in pushing legislators out of politics as it has in prompting them to seek other elected positions. As Table 3 indicates, 27 of the 37 term limited legislators, over 70 percent of them, attempted to continue their political careers in an uninterrupted fashion by immediately getting elected to the other house or to some other office. Sixteen of the 27 who ran for office, 59 percent were successful (three term limited legislators lost to another term limited legislator). Term limited legislators have demonstrated a strong desire to stay in an elected environment and, by and large, have been able to do so. When it comes to elective offices, Arizona has a good “opportunity structure” — a governing system that provides a generous number of positions on the local as well as state level for those seeking elective office.²¹

Table 3
Actions of Term Limited Legislators in the Next Election

Item	Total	Percent
Term limited legislators	37	100
Senate members	13	35
House members	24	65
Term limited legislators: What they did		
House members who ran for Senate	15	41
Senate members who ran for House	2	5
Those who ran for other offices	10	27
Staying in elective office		
Those who won any office	16	43
Those elected to other legislative body	11	30
Those who lost to another term limited legislator	3	8

Source: David Berman, Ph.D., Morrison Institute for Public Policy, 2004.

Competition and Voter Choice

One anticipated benefit of term limit reform was that by creating more open seats, there would be greater competition for legislative offices and, thus, greater voter choice among candidates. The actual net effect of term limits on competition, though, is difficult to pinpoint. Available information is somewhat positive in showing a slight overall increase in the number of pre-primary legislative candidates from 1998 to 2000. Although the number dipped slightly in 2002, it was still higher at that time than in the 1990s.

There are, however, several caveats one should take into account in interpreting these findings. For one, the term limits law itself may have created the large drop in candidates between 1996 and 2000 – many people appear to have passed up the opportunity to run in 1998 so that they could contend for one of the many seats

forced open by term limits in the 2000 election. As one legislator remarked in 1998: “Why compete for something that will be an open seat in two years.”²² For this reason, the gap in turnout between 1998 and 2000 may have been distorted. Another difficulty in interpreting the effects of term limits is untangling the impact of this reform on the 2000 and 2002 elections from that of state public campaign financing, adopted by voters in 1998 and first implemented in 2000. Survey research leads us to believe that both were important, but which of the two was more important is uncertain.²³

In assessing the effects of term limits on competition, one also has to note that these, to some extent, could have been negative as well as positive. Some interviewees suggested, for example, that term limits have discouraged competition by making the office more of a “dead-end” position and, thus, less attractive from a career perspective. On the whole, however, the extent to which the “dead-end” nature of the office has discouraged people from running seems minimal. Some interviewees felt the term limited nature of the office has generally little to do with the decision to run or not to run. Prospective candidates either do not think about term limits or find them far less important than other factors, such as the amount of competition and the availability of campaign funds.²⁴ From the historical data, it appears that many of those who decide to run do not expect to be in the legislature long enough to be term limited – that eight years is more than enough time to do what they want. Some too may feel that if they decided to stay around they could always do so by moving to the other house (this, as noted later, is a common ambition). In essence, many may not perceive the job to be a dead-end one.

On the whole, interviewees suggested that by creating more open seats, term limits have encouraged greater competition for legislative positions and more choices for voters. People, they said, have run for office who would not have done so if they had to face an incumbent. To a certain extent, term limits have also increased competition for various offices by encouraging or forcing legislators to look elsewhere to continue their political careers. Within the legislature, the

Table 4
Legislative Candidates Since 1990*

Election Year	Total Candidates	Candidates per Seat	Population per Seat
1990	189	2.1	40,724
1992	207	2.3	42,778
1994	180	2.0	45,000
1996	211	2.3	46,987
1998	162	1.8	51,111
2000	223	2.5	57,007
2002	217	2.4	61,111

*Number of candidates filing pre-primary nominating petitions for a seat in the 90-member Arizona Legislature. Does not include write-ins or post-primary filers.

Source: *Arizona Capitol Times*, 2004.

desire to continue political careers has frequently prompted legislators in one house to refocus their effort on getting elected to the other house, thus increasing the competitive pool for these positions. Movement of this type is encouraged by the fact that senators and representatives are elected from the same districts – a switch means no change in the electoral base. By forcing out legislators anxious to continue their careers, the reform has also indirectly improved the general competitive situation by providing additional candidates for a variety of other races such as secretary of state, state treasurer, state corporation commission, and a variety of local offices.

Composition

When it comes to the composition of the legislature, supporters of term limits felt that this reform would bring greater representation to women, minorities, members of the minority party, and, more generally, people with new ideas and outlooks. Proponents also expected that term limits would lead to the replacement of career politicians in the legislature by citizen legislators uninterested in building political careers. Changes in these directions, however, are difficult to discern in Arizona.

Compared to other states, Arizona is a place where women always have done well as legislative candidates, though women have been very under-represented when compared to their number in the population. Since term limits went into effect, the number of women legislators has actually declined, as it has on a national basis in recent years. In the first round of term limits, women did relatively well: five of the 32 women serving in 1993, (16%) were eventually term limited, compared to 17 of the 60 men (28%). Matters, however, were reversed for the class of 1995: seven of the 11 women elected that year (64%) wound up term limited compared to eight of the 19 men (42%).

Thus far, term limits appear to have made little difference in regard to the representation of minorities. In recent years, there have been gains in legislative seats for Hispanics, but Native Americans and African Americans have held steady or lost representation (some gains in Hispanic representation have come at the expense of African Americans). The number of Hispanics has grown from nine in 1997 to 13 in 2003, the largest delegation ever, in large part because of district changes.

Republicans have controlled the state House of Representatives since 1966 – the year the “one-person, one vote” standard forced a change in the basic structure of the legislature – and have lost

Table 5
Women in the Arizona Legislature*

Years	House Number (Percent)	Senate Number (Percent)	Total Number (Percent)
1993-94	23 (38%)	9 (30%)	32 (36%)
1995-96	19 (32%)	8 (27%)	27 (30%)
1997-98	25 (42%)	8 (27%)	33 (37%)
1999-00	25 (42%)	7 (23%)	32 (36%)
2001-02	22 (37%)	9 (30%)	31 (34%)
2003-04	16 (27%)	8 (27%)	24 (27%)

*Based on election results only.
Source: Arizona Capitol Times, 2004.

Table 6
Seats Held by Democrats

Years	House Number (Percent)	Senate Number (Percent)	Total Number (Percent)
1993-94	25 (42%)	12 (40%)	37 (41%)
1995-96	22 (37%)	11 (37%)	33 (37%)
1997-98	22 (37%)	12 (40%)	34 (38%)
1999-00	20 (33%)	14 (47%)	34 (38%)
2001-02	24 (40%)	15 (50%)	39 (43%)
2003-04	21 (35%)	13 (44%)	34 (38%)

Source: Arizona Capitol Times, 2004.

control of the Senate on only a few occasions since that time. In 2001-2002 a 15-15 tie between Democrats and Republicans in the Senate produced an unusual governing coalition as moderate Republicans and Democrats joined hands, and more conservative Republicans found themselves isolated. Following the 2002 election, Republicans recaptured the Senate and the coalition came to an end.

With the exception of a modest bump upward in the 2000 election, Democrats have made few gains since term limits. Term limits have prevented 37 from running for re-election but these people have largely been replaced by others from the same party. The underlying issue with party representation is that the redistricting process, whether conducted by the legislature or an independent commission, has created districts that overwhelmingly favor one party over the other.

Recent elections have brought some demographic changes. Agewise, for example, the Senate appears to be getting a bit older, in part, perhaps, because term limits have encouraged older and more experienced House members to move to the Senate. Contrary to the hopes of term limits supporters, however, the reform has not filled legislative chambers with citizen legislators with little or no political ambition who are willing to return to their private lives after a few years of service. The legislature is attractive to career politicians. Most Arizona legislators, according to a 2002 survey of that body, plan to run for another office sometime in their career and only a few plan to retire following their current legislative service. Under term limits they are forced to find ways of staying in legislative office, for example, by switching from one house to the other, and taking advantage of opportunities for other positions as soon as they appear. Many spend much time preparing their next move, a preoccupation that some interviewees felt distracts them from their duties as legislators.

On the positive side, term limits have meant there are more legislators with experience in both legislative chambers. To a certain extent, the House has always served as a training ground for the Senate. Yet, while movement from the House to the Senate was common prior to term limits, it has since accelerated. Those interviewed expect the trend to continue accelerating. Eleven term limited legislators made this switch in 2000 and 2002. Since term limits went into effect, a few legislators

Table 7
Average Age of Legislators*

Session Starting	House	Senate
1993	49.1	49.7
1995	49.3	50.1
1997	49.6	49.5
1999	47.5	52.2
2001	49.2	51.8
2003	49.2	53.2

*Calculated from legislators' biographies.
Source: David Berman, Ph.D., Morrison Institute for Public Policy, 2004.

Table 8
"Arizona Legislators: After service in the present chamber, what are you likely to do?"
(number of respondents=44)

Item	Number Checking	Percent
Run for other chamber*	21	48
Run for statewide office	9	21
Run for U.S. House or Senate	9	21
Run for local office	7	16
Retire	5	11
Take appointive office	4	9
Return to non-political career	4	9
Engage in lobbying/consulting	4	9
No further office	3	7

*Nineteen of the 21 legislators who planned to run for the other chamber were serving in the House.
Source: Survey by John M. Carey, Gary F. Moncrief, Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda W. Powell, 2002, in cooperation with the Joint Project on Term Limits, supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation and a grant from the National Science Foundation.

have even moved from the Senate to the “lower” House. Switches from one body to another reduce the loss of expertise in the legislature as a whole and encourage cross fertilization and greater awareness and understanding of the other house. On the other hand, the movement undermines the term limit goal of bringing new people into office. It has also produced tension by increasing the competition for leadership positions.

Representation

Interviews suggest that term limits have made little impact on the way lawmakers regard their constituents. The principal exception to this may occur as lawmakers become lame ducks in their last two years in office and, thus, feel free to take some action that is unpopular among their constituents without fear of being punished at the polls. Some of those interviewed gave examples of this type of behavior. On the other hand, many legislators seem willing to continue to cater to people in their districts even as they near the end of their eight year terms either because they hope to regain the seat after sitting out one term or to represent the same people as a member of the other house. Many legislators appear to have become more future-oriented in thinking about their political careers, but often their ambitions center on appealing to the same set of constituents.

General Institutional Effects

When it comes to the legislative body itself, term limits in Arizona have made three basic underlying changes: (1) enlarging the pool of inexperienced legislators; (2) converting legislators into a group of short-timers; and (3) creating a situation where, in the opinion of many, there is too little time to work out basic operational problems caused by inexperience or to devote to long-term issues of concern to the state.

The Inexperience Problem

Along with contributing to turn over, term limits have contributed to a marked decline in the level of legislative experience. In 1990, the average representative had seven years of legislative service and the average senator had 11 years. By contrast, in 2003 the average number of years was two for representatives and approximately six for senators. In the ten-year period prior to the adoption of term limits, 1983-1992, the average service was 6.5 years for representatives and over nine for senators. In the post term limits decade, 1993-2003, the average dropped to 3.5 for representatives and seven for senators.

Term limits have led to the departure of several old-timers and, with this, a loss of institutional memory regarding programs, policies, and legislative norms, a loss of expertise in various policy areas, and the loss of people who could hold their own in dealing with lobbyists, staff, and agency heads.

Table 9
Legislative Experience

Period	Average Number of Years	
	House Members	Senate Members
1990	7.0	11.0
1991	6.3	6.8
1992	6.5	7.6
1993	4.4	6.6
1994	5.0	7.5
1995	3.6	6.2
1996	4.6	7.1
1997	3.8	6.2
1998	4.8	7.2
1999	3.3	7.4
2000	4.3	8.4
2001	2.7	7.0
2002	3.6	7.7
2003	2.0	5.9
1973-1982	5.3	5.9
1983-1992	6.5	9.4
1992-2003	3.5	7.0

Source: Arizona Legislative Council, 2004.

Conversely, the increase in the number of inexperienced legislators has produced a body where more legislators are uncertain about how to do their jobs and are relatively uninformed about the issues facing the state. Interviewees also suggested that new legislators are more vulnerable to manipulation and control by lobbyists, staff, and executive agency heads and more likely to make mistakes. Some interviewees contended that inexperience had already figured in policy mistakes, including the alternative fuels fiasco, because newcomers failed to pick up on danger signals that more experienced lawmakers regularly catch. Interviewees felt that the problems associated with inexperience have been compounded in the term limited setting because legislators are more likely to move to positions of leadership before they are ready for such positions. Overall, though, they suggested that the Senate may be less affected than the House by inexperience problems because it has more experienced members.

Short-Sightedness

Along with the inexperience problem, interviewees suggested that term limits have created difficulties by encouraging members to be short-sighted. Knowing that they can serve only so long, legislators are more in a hurry to make their mark and move on. In this regard one interviewee noted: “When you realize you only have eight years at the most, everything has to happen much quicker.” Being in a hurry means trying to gain notice by the introduction of bills that are not all that vital and trying to move up quickly into important committee or leadership positions. Short-timer status was also equated by observers with chilling the legislative climate — making members less likely to take the time to get to know each other or to try to get along, less willing to compromise, less inclined to listen to leadership, less respectful of the process, and less likely to care about the welfare of the institution as a whole. On policy issues, the short-timer orientation was felt to have encouraged legislators to be relatively more concerned with a set of issues which have immediate payoffs, ignore the long-term implications of their decisions, and to be less concerned with solving long-range problems or multi-year undertakings.

Too Little Time

A third largely negative impact stemming from the term limit imposition in Arizona, in the eyes of many of those interviewed, is that the eight-year limit simply does not provide enough time. Several interviewees suggested, for example, that the problems associated with inexperience are likely to be permanent because their resolution requires more years of on-the-job training than allowed by the law. Though there was considerable disagreement among those interviewed on just how long it takes to learn the legislative job, several legislators remarked that for most legislators, especially legislative leaders, this required at least six years. Thus, with an eight-year limit, legislators are forced out of office just as they begin to understand the issues and can stand on their own two feet. Interviewees also saw time limits as undermining what had been a highly functional mellowing process in the Arizona legislature — one where long years of service had tended to make ideologically driven legislators more moderate or pragmatic as members got to know each other on a personal basis and formed friendships that transcended party lines, making it easier to form bipartisan coalitions. Another aspect of the time problem was that the short amount of time allowed prevented legislators from focusing on long-term problems facing the state, even if they were predisposed to do so. As one interviewee noted: “There’s no time to see things through.”

Effects on Institutional Actors

Inexperience, short-sightedness, and time limitations have perhaps had their most profound impact — nearly all negative — on legislative leaders. Legislative committees also experienced several problems. On the other hand, observers have seen staffers and lobbyists to have generally benefitted from term limits.

Leadership

Power in the Arizona Legislature continues to be concentrated in its leaders. The Senate president and House speaker, who are chosen out of party caucuses, appoint committee chairs and members, decide which bills go to which committees, and generally control the fate of proposed measures. Still, interviewees suggested, term limits have made life far more difficult for legislative leaders to control members. Indeed, some suggested that the effect of term limits on leadership has been devastating. The Mushroom Coalition and Cellar Dweller rebellions illustrate the difficulties legislative leaders have had in pulling their caucuses together.

Under term limits, leaders can be expected to generally rise to the top more quickly but also to stay there for a briefer period and with reduced influence. The reform has forced the legislature away from a system where leadership was often an award for long service. It has also meant more frequent turnover and more frequent and intense competition for these positions. Thus far, leadership turnover has been particularly apparent in the House. Following the 2000 election, five new people moved into the six House leadership positions — the only person carried over moved from majority whip to speaker. Following the 2002 election, another five new people joined the leadership ranks, the only holdover moved from minority whip to assistant minority leader. While turnover has not been as great in the Senate, competition for leadership positions has become more intense as experienced people moving over from the House have swelled the ranks of contenders. In 2002, for example, the term limited speaker of the house managed to get elected to the Senate and made a serious though ultimately unsuccessful campaign to become president of that body.

Interviewees saw leaders under term limits as less likely to do an effective job because they emerge without the benefit of years of training and because they become relatively powerless lame ducks much sooner than in the past. They were also felt to be less effective because members, as short-timers, are less inclined to go along with what leaders want, and more inclined to challenge their decisions. As a House leader put it in 2003: “because of term limits the place runs like a mob without any sense of discipline, adherence to protocol, or respect for leadership.” Term limits, as suggested in the Mushroom and Cellar Dweller episodes, have had their most noticeable impact on the ability of the Republican party leaders to control their caucuses.

Table 10
Leadership Turnover*
(in percentages)

Year	House	Senate	Total
1993-94	50%	67%	58%
1995-96	50%	50%	50%
1997-98	50%	100%	75%
1999-00	33%	50%	42%
2001-02	83%	50%	67%
2003-04	83%	67%	75%

*This table was constructed by counting the number of members in leadership positions who were not in leadership in the previous legislature and dividing that number by the total number of leadership positions. There were 6 leadership positions in each chamber: speaker of the house, majority leader, majority whip, minority leader, minority whip, and assistant minority leader in the House; and president, majority leader, majority whip, minority leader, minority whip, and assistant minority leader in the Senate.

Source: David Berman, Ph.D., Morrison Institute for Public Policy, 2004.

Committees

Term limits have not produced any change in the way committee positions are filled. Chairs and committee members are chosen by the Senate president and House speaker, not so much because of seniority, but because of their help in getting the presiding officer elected.

As in the legislature as a whole, legislative committee positions have been subject to high levels of turnover in recent years. Committee chair turnover has been particularly noticeable in the Senate in recent years, in part, because of the change in partisan control of that body. Six of the current ten Senate committees have been in existence since 1999. Of the six, only one has been headed by the same person more than two years. The extent to which committee chairs had immediate previous service on the committee they later headed has ranged considerably from year to year: six of the ten had such experience in 2001-2002, while only one of ten had such experience in 2003-2004. In the House, there has been a bit more stability. In this body, 13 of the current 16 committees have been in existence since 1999 and of the 13, five have been headed by the same person more than two years. In 2001-2002, seven of the 13 chairs had immediate past experience on their committees, and in 2003-04, ten of the 13 had this experience. In the House, committee chairs have commonly moved up from the position of vice chair.

Though the situation varies from house to house, under term limits committees once dominated by long-time chairs are now being operated by relatively inexperienced people who are less knowledgeable about the subject areas of the committees. Looking for experienced leaders to head committees, legislative leaders have sometimes turned to people returning to a legislative chamber where they had served for several years or to people with long years of service and leadership in the other house. Legislators with backgrounds as elected municipal officials have also had the type of experience that has given them an advantage in moving into committee leadership positions. Leaders too have made some reductions in the number of committees to make up for the lack of qualified chairs, but, in some cases, still have turned positions over to junior people. When it comes to committee members, some committee chairs have sought to overcome the inexperience problem by bringing in specialists for briefing sessions. Often they have given newcomers vice chair positions for training purposes.

Staff

Staff assistance has been of particular importance in helping newcomers to the Arizona legislature learn how to do their job. Survey data collected in 2002, for example, found 44 Arizona legislators ranking staff more important than a host of other factors, e.g., working on a committee or the help of senior colleagues.

Table 11
“When you were first elected to the legislature, how important were each of the following in terms of learning how to do your job?”*

Item	Number Indicating	Mean
Legislative staff	44	4.14
Working on a committee	43	4.09
Senior colleagues	44	3.98
Listening to debate on the floor	43	3.91
Trial and error	43	3.56
Formal training	44	3.14
Party leaders	43	2.3

*Arizona legislators' responses on a scale of 1 to 5, from not important at all to very important.

Source: Carey, et al, 2002.

Interviews conducted for this study suggest that the legislative staff as a whole has become more important as a result of term limits: the nonpartisan staff in providing basic information and showing newcomers how to do things and partisan staff attached to leadership in providing policy direction. Some felt that the partisan staff had gained considerably more influence than the nonpartisan staff, indeed, that the partisan staff had gained too much influence. This complaint came primarily from non-partisan staffers, members of the minority Democratic party, and moderate Republicans. In the House, some noted, lobbyists first try to win over the leadership staff, feeling that if they are able to do so, the leaders will follow. Senate members tend to be more experienced than in the House and, thus, appear less dependent on staff. Currently, the staff is probably more important to Republicans than Democrats because they have fewer old-time legislators in office.

Lobbyists

While interviewees saw lobbying groups generally benefitting from the lack of institutional memory in the legislature as a whole, they differed in their assessment of the impact of lobbyists on newcomers. The answer depended on who was asked. One view, commonly offered by veteran legislators, is that new legislators have not only increasingly relied on lobbyists for information but have been manipulated or misled by lobbyists because they lack experience in dealing with them. One veteran legislator reported: "I've observed new legislators listening to experienced lobbyists. My orientation is that the biases in these conversations are huge. After a certain amount of time in this institution, you recognize this bias, but the inexperienced representatives don't understand just how flawed this information can be." Another veteran added: "New legislators sometimes don't realize that they are not getting all sides of a story from a lobbyist." Some newcomers, on the other hand, reported they were somewhat suspicious of lobbyists. Not knowing who to trust, they shied away from lobbyists in general or took what they said with a grain of salt. One newcomer reported that she felt that lobbyists were trying to take advantage of her and others in the freshman class and, in effect, were saying to each other "lets get them before they know too much." She was very hard on lobbyists, wanting to know their qualifications and wanting them to cut to the point. Other newcomers indicated that they were far from being entirely dependent on lobbyists – some turned to legislative staff or other legislators for information and guidance or to people outside the legislature such as university researchers. Some lobbyists interviewed were happy to report that more and more people were relying on them, while others felt that newcomers do not rely on them enough.

Overall, it seems fair to say, that because of their lack of knowledge about the issues, some legislators have been tempted to rely on lobbyists for information and some, no doubt, have been misled as a result. Lobbyists have also taken advantage of legislative turnover by bringing back bills rejected in previous years, hoping no one is around who remembers why they were rejected. The extent of lobbyist influence is probably less severe in the Senate because many members of that body (currently 19 of the 30) have served in the House and cut their teeth there, learning whom they can trust and whom they cannot. More generally, though, the traditional notion that lobbyists are constrained because they depend on building a relationship of trust with legislators and are likely to be wary of crossing them up may be less applicable in a term limited legislature because the chances that someone will be around to pay back lobbyists for their misdeeds are reduced.

The turnover stimulated by term limits has generally made the work of lobbyists much more difficult in that they now have to regularly make contact with and educate a larger stream of

newcomers. Turnover, though, has hurt some groups far more than others. It has worked to the particular disadvantage of many old time Arizona lobbyists who had built up long-term relationships with legislators. Many of these legislators are now gone and have been replaced by newcomers who don't have the slightest idea who these old-time lobbyists are. In a sense, the one-time powerhouses are now in the same boat as everyone else as they scramble to introduce themselves to the new legislators.

Term limits, in sum, have not, as its proponents argued, reduced the overall influence of interest groups. Interest groups in Arizona have always been important and continue to be so. However, they have had to operate somewhat differently because of term limits. Many have adapted to the new conditions by spending more and working harder to establish contact with the parade of new legislators. Those who had relied on long standing contacts with influential senior members have lost their edge. The future belongs to those who are willing and able to win over transitory leaders and work harder to ingratiate themselves with a continuous parade of new members and new leaders. Some are struggling to establish relationships with the passing parade of new members and new leaders. This situation is not so bad for groups with resources. Some now offer new campaign services as a way of extending their influence.

Effects on Climate, Process, Policy, and Status

Looking for other institutional effects takes us into questions of how term limits have affected the legislative work climate (the level of civility and conflict), the legislative process, legislative outcomes, and questions concerning the overall status of the legislature vis-à-vis other institutions.

Civility and Conflict

The lack of civility in the legislature has been a long-term problem, one that was apparent before voters adopted term limits. The quality of legislative life started to sour during the 1988 impeachment of Mecham and got even worse since AzScam. One legislator who decided to call it quits in 1992 remarked: "It's been very hectic, the tensions, the divisiveness. I wake up in the morning and I tell my wife, 'I don't want to go to work.' It's not fun anymore."²⁵ There is a long history of bitter splits not only between Democrats and Republicans but, perhaps even more important, among Republicans along ideological lines.

Interviewees suggested that term limits, if anything, have made the bickering and problem of trying to build a consensus even worse. Term limits, as evidenced in the Mushroom and Cellar Dweller rebellions, have added to the conflict by creating a further division within the Republican party on the basis of time served in the legislature. Term limits also have fomented division by making it easier for members to defy party leaders and by making it more difficult to work out partisan or ideological differences because they limit the amount of time legislators have to get to know each other on a personal basis.

The Process

Term limits have produced little change in how the legislature operates in terms of basic procedures — though some reforms such as the formal commitment to the 100-day session have partially reflected the desire to at least publicly define the body as a "citizen legislature."

The emergence of a large group of newcomers more anxious than ever to get involved and make a mark for themselves has, however, generated pressures for a more inclusive policymaking process. This has been especially marked in regard to the making of the budget, the most important thing the legislature does on a regular basis.

Thus far, term limits have not brought an increase in the introduction of legislation. The number of bills introduced and passed in the legislature as a whole has steadily decreased since 2000. Some observers suggested, however, that term limits have led to an increase in the number of frivolous bills being introduced by new legislators to make some sort of record and/or to please some interest group. With a weakening of leadership and the committee system, some observers saw bills being passed with less vetting. On a broader level, observers linked constant turnover in members and leaders with more general chaos, more emotional decision making, and less predictable results.

Policy

When it comes to policy, observers saw term limits hindering legislative efforts to deal with long-range problems such as air pollution brought on by population growth and with complicated matters such as the budget. Legislators, because of term limits, may have to get by with a more superficial understanding of big issues. Term limits, interviewees felt, also encourage legislators to concentrate on “smaller” issues and short-term problems for which there is an immediate payoff and to ignore the long-term consequences of their decisions. Legislators who are inclined to deal with long-term problems are frustrated because term limits mean they will not be around long enough to solve them. As one interviewee noted: “There’s no time to see things through.” In the area of regional politics, some rural legislators fear that term limits weaken rural areas of the state because there has been a practice in these places to send the same people to the legislature time after time so that they can gravitate into positions of influence they can use on behalf of the area.

Status

Over the last several years the Arizona Legislature has seldom received better than a “C” grade from the public. The legislature’s overall low standing reflects a variety of criticisms. Central among these are that it has been out of touch with the voters, overrun with lobbyists, and bogged

Table 12
Legislative Bill Totals Since 1990

Year	Bills Introduced			Bills Passed		Bills Vetoes
	Senate	House	Total	Number	Percent	
1990	559	692	1251	417	33%	5
1991	476	503	979	335	34%	12
1992	545	597	1142	369	32%	8
1993	433	393	826	261	32%	2
1994	565	598	1163	380	33%	0
1995	407	550	957	309	32%	8
1996	425	571	996	385	39%	17
1997	468	577	1045	307	29%	7
1998	431	698	1129	315	28%	12
1999	419	706	1125	374	33%	21
2000	559	721	1280	420	33%	2
2001	584	637	1221	416	34%	15
2002	470	712	1182	353	30%	9
2003	367	541	908	285	31%	17

Source: Arizona Capitol Times, 2004.

down in a decision-making style characterized by behind-the-scene manipulations, intimidation, deal making, and procedural tricks. Not surprisingly in recent years, there has been a growing impatience with the legislature and an increased willingness on the part of all types of groups to use the courts to prod the legislature into action and to use the initiative process to circumvent the body in order to make changes. Term limits reform reflected this broad pattern of discontent with the legislature, but it is not clear if it has done much, if anything, to improve citizen evaluations of the legislature or improve the status of the legislature vis-à-vis other institutions.

On the other hand, there is little to indicate that term limits have escalated the shift of power away from the legislature. Opponents of term limits felt that the reform would, in particular, play to the advantage of the governor. Generally, interviewees for this study, did see a gradual shift of power away from the legislature to the governor. They did not, however, see general power relations with the governor as having much to do with term limits. These, they felt, were largely set by the personal qualities and inclinations of the governors, e.g., whether they were proactive or reactive. Some, though, saw term limits giving agency heads an advantage in dealing with legislators on budgeting matters and, by default, greater responsibility for coping with long-term and complex problems.

Concluding Observations

Many Arizona legislators would, if they could, eliminate or modify the term limit law. Living with term limits has caused them to make sometimes painful adjustments. To get around the limits, legislators have frequently considered running for another elective office, most commonly the other legislative body (even senators have thought about “stepping down” to the House), swapping legislative seats, and, to at least keep the seat in the family, having a relative fill in for a term or so. Living with term limits has also forced some out just at the peak of their power and influence in a legislative body. Overall, though, the effects of the term limits law have been somewhat mitigated by the ability of legislators to move from house to house.

On the plus side, term limits have given Arizona citizens an increased opportunity to hold legislative office and encouraged greater competition for legislative and other seats, giving voters a greater choice among candidates. To some extent term limits have been a force toward a more inclusive governing process. At the same time, they have generally weakened leadership and, by bringing in more inexperienced members, generally increased the influence of others in the process, particularly lobbyists and staff, though not all lobbyists and staff have gained equally.

Recent newcomers to the Arizona Legislature are probably not any less knowledgeable than previous classes of newcomers. However, under term limits there are more newcomers and members have less time to learn their jobs. To cope with the problem of bringing members up to speed, legislative leaders have increased training, both orientation and ongoing, in regard to issues and the institution. The legislature could do more, but most interviewees noted that training can only do so much. Several contended there is really no substitute for on-the-job training or “for jumping into the process.” The rub, at least for some legislators, is that the existing eight year limit provides too little time to acquire the necessary leadership skills and that just as these skills are acquired the legislators have to leave.

Endnotes

1. The law requires that legislators must be a U.S. citizen, 25 years old, and a resident in the state for at least three years and in the county from which they are elected for at least one year. In 1998 voters increased legislative pay from \$15,000 to \$24,000 per year. In 2000 they rejected a proposal that would increase the pay to \$30,000.
2. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 63 U.S.L.W. 4413 (May 22, 1995).
3. The interviews were conducted between April 2003 and March 2004 mostly in person but also by telephone and e-mail, by David R. Berman and/or Mary Lou Cooper, Program Manager, Council of State Governments, whose help on this project has been indispensable. Interviews were considered confidential and the interviewed individuals who are quoted in this paper are not identified. In addition to the interviews, the author conducted an extensive review of newspaper files and public records. For views concerning the likely effects of term limits, I drew upon arguments made by people supporting and opposing the reform as found, for example, in Gerald Benjamin, Michael J. Malbin, editors, *Limiting Legislative Terms* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1992), Appendix A. This research was undertaken as part of the Joint Project on Term Limits funded by the Smith Richardson Foundation.
4. Steve Yozwiak, "Politicians' Standing Plummetts," *The Arizona Republic* (February 13, 1991), A1, A7.
5. Mary K. Reinhart, "Lawmakers open session tomorrow aiming to fit priorities into 100 days," *The Arizona Daily Star* (January 10, 1993) np.
6. Chris Moeser, " 'Mushrooms' fight for education," *The Arizona Republic* (April 4, 1999): A6.
7. Quoted in "Session Wrap-Up," *Arizona Capitol Times* (May 21, 1999), p. 17.
8. *Ibid.*
9. See: Michael Kiefer, "The Work of Art Hamilton," *New Times* (October 1, 1998), np.
10. Chris Moeser, "Term Limits: Change May Not Bring Change," *The Arizona Republic* (January 9, 2000), B5.
11. Robert Robb, "Term limits work, and lawmakers hate that," *The Arizona Republic* (June 16, 2000), B11.
12. Richard Ruelas, "Good Voters Go for Bad Legislators," *Arizona Republic* (December 1, 2000), B1.
13. Beth Lucas, "Term Limits Arrive: What's Next," *Arizona Capital Times* (May 5, 2000): 1, 13, 14.
14. "Term limited representative may challenge own party's senator," The Associated Press State and Local Wire, (April 10, 2000).
15. Beth Lucas, "Sen. Smith Won't Seek Reelection, Blames Senate Atmosphere," *Arizona Capitol Times* (November 23, 2001), p. 20.
16. Quoted by Joe Kullman, "Lawmakers urge more commitment to environment," *East Valley Tribune* (June 29, 2001), np.
17. Quoted by Chip Scutari and Robbie Sherwood, "New Legislature has fewer women," *The Arizona Republic* (December 16, 2002): A1.
18. "GOP bloc may swing budget vote," *The Arizona Republic* (June 9, 2003), A1, A2 at A2.
19. Paul Davenport, "More legislators included in closed-door talks on budget," Associated Press State and Local Wire, February 24, 2004.
20. Published reports citing such examples are found in: Beth Lucas, "Term Limits Arrive: What's Next," *Arizona Capital Times* (May 5, 2000): 1, 13, 14 and Mark Anderson, "Changes on the Way: Preliminary Effects of Term Limits in Arizona," *U.S. Term Limits Foundation Outlook Series*, November 1995, Volume IV, Number 4, 13 pages.
21. On Oklahoma see: Gary W. Copeland, "Term Limitations and Political Careers in Oklahoma: In, Out, Up, or Down," in Benjamin et al, pp. 179-157.
22. Joe Burchell, "There's no fun in legislative run, Arizonans say Term Limits and lack of civility are cited," *The Arizona Daily Star* (July 5, 1998): 1A.
23. See General Accounting Office, *Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experience of Two States That Offer Full Public Funding for Political Candidates*, (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, May 9, 2003). Senator Pete Rios has suggested that open seats draw people out – while public funding evens the money field, incumbents are still difficult to defeat because they have an advantage in name identification. Quoted by Mary Jo Pitzl, Chip Scutari, Ashley Bach, "Candidate fillings hit state record," *The Arizona Republic* (June 13, 2002): 1, 16.
24. One interviewed former legislator remarked that he did not think about term limits when deciding to whether to run for the legislature but, after getting elected, the recognition that he was only going to be there eight years at best, prompted him to make his mark as soon as possible and he did so by sponsoring education legislation.
25. Don Harris, "Calling it quits at the Capitol, Record 19 leaving legislative posts," *The Arizona Republic* (May 10, 1992), B1, B6.