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In Africa, policies of confusion and compromise, have plunged the Congo back fifty years in its development. They have subsidized and supported the socialist and aggressive Nasser government in Egypt. They have subsidized and supported the tyranny in Ghana. They have spread across the entire continent a smokescreen behind which economic and social chaos has been able to rampage in the name of progress.

Real progress in Africa, as a result, has been stunted and shunted aside. This is a foreign policy that responds like a highstrung puppy to any mention of colonialism but shies like a frightened colt from the real problems of development in these underdeveloped lands, from the problems of basic education, administrative responsibility, and the accumulation of native capital without which these nations will remain forever dependent upon international charity. Such nations are free in name only. And the present response to their problems has been a response in name only.

In Southeast Asia, the present foreign policy lunged for neutrality in Laos and came up with a creeping communist take-over. In Vietnam we fare no better. India, shocked for a time by the Chinese invasion, has drifted again toward a complacency encouraged by official U. S. vacillation. Pakistan, once a great ally of the West, has been frustrated and finally repelled by indecision and now seeks to deal with the dragon that it cannot slay and against which our policies offer no protection.

But there are failures closer to home, failures toward which all the great states of the Gulf face as they look to the south.

A year ago it seemed that we might wipe away the dark and spreading stain of the Bay of Pigs. A year ago the nations of Latin America were electrified by a sudden surge of American leadership. In the missile crisis there was real meaning to hemispheric solidarity, real meaning to

the hope that America, even if not loved, would be respected in the vast reaches that are the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine.

But time and failure have eroded the moment, blighted the brightness, and shadowed the future. Cuba ticks like a time bomb, awaiting either the heroism of others or another moment of political expediency. It festers like a cancer, spreading its growths throughout Latin America while the Yankee doctors play golf, go sailing and prescribe nothing but diplomatic aspirins; while the Administration will not even fully enforce the sanctions it has been given to shake loose the Soviet toehold in our hemisphere.

Pro-Castro assassins roam the streets of Venezuela, killing virtually at will and giving hero-sized interviews to newsmen. Brazil stands at a state of siege, reaping the dragons' teeth sown by a leftist government.

The Dominican Republic, plagued by Castro pressures and infiltrated, proved a shaky showcase of Administration policy. Now it is smashed altogether by military leaders who saw communism, not true progress, building behind the facade.

The same in Honduras. And the response now is to try to make those new regimes fail just as once we tried to make the fallen ones succeed. Argentina and Peru had similar experiences earlier, when the military was forced to intercede to assure regimes that could stabilize the nations and protect them against penetration. Ecuador and Guatemala also have seen the military replace other governments which could not bring order or security to the nations. And all of this in the midst of what the Administration had boasted would solve the problems of Latin America--the Alliance for Progress.

Why has that scheme failed also?

It has failed because it was shallow in concept, muddled in administration and misguided in direction.

Bolivia stands as a monument to its ineptitude. As far back as May 14, 1961, President Kennedy made it clear that Bolivia was to be a monument instead to the best and brightest hopes of Latin America. To the leader of the Bolivian revolutionary movement which the Administration obviously had picked as a model, the President wrote that "This great revolution has blazed a path for others to follow." And he pledged a long-range program to assist it, to make it the jewel in the crown of the Alliance for Progress. Bolivia has received more aid, per capita, than any other country in the hemisphere. The Administration still wants more for it.

But what is this handpicked revolution really like? What hope does it hold? How will Latin America fare if the Administration has its way and others follow the path of the so-called revolution in Bolivia, the one that the Administration supports, subsidizes, and sanctifies.

It could hardly be called democratic. It came into power with a secret police, political prisons, a political militia, and a high tolerance for communist influence. Its ideology is basically Marxist.

By the time it was handpicked as the answer for Latin America, the government had nationalized 70 per cent of the means of production and had expropriated privately worked lands rather than properly work the land it already owned.

It had socialized the tin mines that had formed the economic base for the nation's industry. And production, under socialism, under the Administration's dream for Latin America, promptly fell off by 59 per cent.

When the Administration discovered and began coddling them, they had also anticipated the Administration's domestic economic policy, the

"purchasing power" theory of economic growth. To get forced draft economic development, the Bolivian revolutionary government, the bright hope, printed more and more money. Simple isn't it? If the people have more to spend, all will prosper. Real productivity was left to run a very poor second.

The result, which seems not to have dismayed the Administration at all, is that by the time it <sup>WAS SELECTED BY THE ADMINISTRATIONS</sup> picked it, the revolutionary, socialist regime had forced the cost of living up more than 3,000 per cent.

It's easy for the present foreign policy to absorb blows such as that. It is, after all, formless to begin with. To show you just how formless, and fiction-ridden, listen to the foreign aid administrator, David Bell, testifying before Congress as to the Bolivian situation. He called it "the most difficult case we have," and admitted that our budgetary support seemed to be getting nowhere. Yet, in an official memorandum, the same David Bell listed Bolivia as a country that had achieved "substantial growth with continuing external independence" as a result of our aid.

What do the Bolivians say of the program? Well, it has proved very useful in a special sense. The failures of socialism now can be, and are, blamed on American aid. But still we subsidize socialism there. Still we hold on to the hope that it will be a model.

Meanwhile, the Castro subversion spreads--social order which the Administration hopes to build with dollars and dependency, crumbles.

The Administration has created no new good neighbors in Latin America. It has, instead, opened the hemisphere's doors to new enemies. The Alliance for Progress has brought no new unity, no true alliance, and no real progress.

Instead, under the Alliance, hopes of unity against Castro have been sacrificed to unrealized hopes of unity in social progress. And social progress has become the progress of socialism.

Domestic and foreign capital, under the Alliance, have been leaving Latin America even faster than the aid program can replace it. Is that progress? Toward what? Bankruptcy perhaps, certainly not progress.

So long as the administration regards the problems of Latin America as nothing more than an exercise in grade school sociology, the Alliance will be an illusion and the progress will be backward.

Land reform is not Latin America's first problem. The wise cultivation of lands already open is the problem. Dependency or interdependence, or whatever the current catchphrase may be, is not the problem; the means to real independence is the challenge. Tolerance of communism is not a sign of political liberalism in Latin America, it is a sign of political unreality and of eventual disaster.

Socialization of industry is not the bright promise of productivity, it is the gloomy precursor of depression and more dependency. Burgeoning bureaucracies to plan for the people is not the answer. People who are educated to plan for themselves is a vital part of the answer. Sound business management cannot grow in lands encouraged to forsake business for bureaucracy, to substitute sociological models for real markets.

Latin America, as indeed the whole world, is today a game of political touch-football for the administration. Latin America's problems, as indeed the whole world's problems, are polished off as parts of the political sloganry of the administration. They are not solved, they are merely salved, by talk, talk, and more talk. They are touched -- not tackled.

If domestic politics demands a new image, then polish up all the slogans of peaceful co-existence. Never mind that, at a time when communism is cracking across the globe, this means that we rush to support it with trade, with treaties, with eased pressures. Leave the problems of a retrenched communist world for tomorrow; solve today only the political

problems of the Administration! Patch a crisis there; prescribe a pill somewhere else; make a concession here, there, the next place; promise, promise, promise; spend, spend, spend, elect, elect, elect. That is the equation from which the formula for our foreign policy failures has been figured. ✓ ✓

Lord knows what baubles will be pulled from the grab-bag in 1964 to divert, with some momentary flash, our eyes from the failures of four fruitless years of floundering foreign policy. There will be something, we can rest assured. Cuba was used once--it may be used again. But sugar-candy must not buy another go-round of the same failures. All Americans, one way or another, will have to pay for the failures so far. They do not have to vote for them. ✓ ✓

Our foreign policy, along with the strength of our domestic economy and the state of our arms, is the front line of the struggle today. We cannot buy peace, we must earn and deserve it. We must win it--win it by foreign policies that are gauged on their service to the cause of freedom everywhere and to the confounding of the enemy's assault. We must win it--by a strength and dedication of purpose at home, by a new depth of patriotism--not by efforts to make it unfashionable. We must win and keep the peace by the proof of our way of life, by the vitality of its production, by the merit of its spirit. We must win and keep the peace by clear declaration to all the world that the cause of freedom will not be negotiated, will not be walled off by compromise and detente. ✓

The peace we seek is the peace of open societies, not closed deals. The only peace we can have is peace in freedom, peace in justice. And in God's good cause and just time we can win that peace; the only peace worthy of the sacrifices we have made and will make; the only peace worthy of the world in which we want our children to live.

Let this be our cause--and the victory will be mankind's. ✓