Native American obesity and the associated health conditions are generally thought to result in part from a genetic predisposition to overeating fats and carbohydrates, called the “thrifty gene.” Although coined by nutritional scientists, this study maintains the origin of the thrifty gene lies in economics. Apparently harmful overconsumption and addiction constitute economically rational behavior if the increment to current utility from adding to one’s stock of “consumption capital” is greater than the present value of utility lost in the future due to ill health and the costs of withdrawal. Tests of these conditions for such “rational addiction” are conducted using two-stage household production approach. The results obtained by estimating this model in a panel of Native and non-Native supermarket scanner data show that both Natives and non-Natives tend to be inherently forward-looking in their nutrient choices, but Natives tend to have far higher long-run demand elasticities for carbohydrates compared to non-Natives. Consequently, reductions in real food prices over time, primarily among foods that are dense in simple carbohydrates, leads Native Americans to over-consume potentially harmful nutrients relative to their traditional diet.

Agricultural cooperatives tend to be riskier than investor-oriented firms, both in a business and financial sense. However, cooperative managers are often reluctant to actively manage risk. Although the “risk management irrelevance proposition” suggests that cooperative managers should be unable to add shareholder value through risk management activities, this study argues that there are several reasons why this is not likely to be the case for cooperatives. Several empirical examples are provided through numerical simulation of pro-forma financial statements from representative agricultural cooperatives. Using mean variance, expected utility and valueat-risk metrics, the results of these simulations show that various risk management strategies can improve the risk-return profile of a typical cooperative.

The Lanchester model of strategic interaction typically considers only two-firm rivalry and one strategic tool. This paper presents an alternative that considers rivalry among several firms using multiple tools. Marketing decisions are dynamically optimal and use equations of motion for market share that are consistent with optimal consumer choice. Using a single-market case study that consists of five years of monthly data on ready to eat cereal sales, advertising, product development investments and new product introductions, we test our model against a similar Lanchester specification. Non-nested specification tests fail to reject the proposed model, but reject the Lanchester alternative.