This publication updates the January 2004 study, New Returns on Investment in the Knowledge Economy: Proposition 301 at Arizona State University, FY 2003. Both works were launched by the report, Seeds of Prosperity: Public Investment in Science and Technology Research (2003), by Morrison Institute for Public Policy. Morrison Institute will periodically publish new material to keep you informed of the status of Proposition 301 investments at Arizona State University.

Since statehood in 1912, Arizona has been among the nation’s leaders in using the initiative process to either adopt a statute or amend the state constitution by placing a measure on the ballot. But such efforts are anything but easy. In fact, organizers have found it to be an expensive, time-consuming and exhausting process – and one that is unlikely to end successfully.

The author writes about Arizona's longstanding belief in direct democracy via referendum, initiative and recall. The Legislature continues to grapple with election reform and strike a balance of how much binding authority should remain in the hands of voters in terms of initiative, referendum and recall, but Arizona’s penchant for people power has been demonstrated since before statehood. In the midst of his campaign for Congress in 1911, for example, Arizona’s Carl Hayden noted that everywhere he went he found voters eager to take control. "The people want their own kind of government,” Hayden told reporters. “They want to be the dictators.”

Almost every state hopes to capitalize on the tremendous wealth and job creation that can be generated by high tech science research-and billions of public dollars are being spent. But everyone is just speculating about the lasting value of these investments. While traditional assessments of return on public investment in science and technology tend to track short-term impacts, such as salaries, patents, and licensing revenues, the main foundations for long-term development of a knowledge economy appear to rely on a number of less tangible accomplishments. For example: Connections - the networks that develop between researchers, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists; Attention - the publicity generated by the research and its networks that attract businesses and talent to locate in a region; and Talent - the highly skilled workers that such research attracts and trains.

These three indicators of economic success-henceforth called the CAT measures-have yet to be quantified and applied in a useful manner. That is the purpose of this study. It will be conducted in three parts, each with a culminating report. The first part will analyze the FY03 science and technology research activities and results for ASU's Proposition 301 initiatives. The second will develop a methodology for quantifying and utilizing the Institute's CAT measures. The third will field test the CAT methodology on a selected aspect of ASU's Proposition 301-funded research, and analyze results to provide Arizona decision-makers with recommendations to guide future policy.

This paper, drawing upon historical data and information from surveys and interviews with more than 50 legislators, lobbyists, and knowledgeable observers, finds that the term limits reform adopted by the Arizona voters in 1992 has caused legislators to make some painful adjustments. Because of term limits many legislators have decided to run for another office prior to the expiration of their terms. This has often meant trying to move from the one legislative house to another, most commonly from the House to the Senate. On the plus side, the report finds that term limits have encouraged greater competition for legislative and other seats and have given voters a greater choice among candidates. To some extent, limits have been a force toward a more inclusive governing process. At the same time, they have generally reduced the power of legislative leaders and generally increased the influence of lobbyists and staff, though not all lobbyists and staff have gained equally. Recent newcomers to the Arizona Legislature are probably not any less knowledgeable than previous classes of newcomers, but under term limits there are more newcomers and members have less time to learn their jobs. For many, the limit to four two-year terms (eight years total) provides too little time to learn how to do the job and do it well.