The author writes about Arizona's longstanding belief in direct democracy via referendum, initiative and recall. The Legislature continues to grapple with election reform and strike a balance of how much binding authority should remain in the hands of voters in terms of initiative, referendum and recall, but Arizona’s penchant for people power has been demonstrated since before statehood. In the midst of his campaign for Congress in 1911, for example, Arizona’s Carl Hayden noted that everywhere he went he found voters eager to take control. "The people want their own kind of government,” Hayden told reporters. “They want to be the dictators.”

Since statehood in 1912, Arizona has been among the nation’s leaders in using the initiative process to either adopt a statute or amend the state constitution by placing a measure on the ballot. But such efforts are anything but easy. In fact, organizers have found it to be an expensive, time-consuming and exhausting process – and one that is unlikely to end successfully.

Arizona faces some big challenges if it is to compete regionally, nationally and globally for the cutting-edge jobs that will help determine our economic future. As hard as state and community leaders are working, the report suggests that Arizona needs even more participation in economic development leadership, more collaboration among economic development groups and a greater sense of urgency. This report identifies a number of important issues that are key to advancing economic development in Arizona.

This follow-up to the 2001 landmark report, "Five Shoes Waiting to Drop on Arizona's Future," focuses on the projected future of the state if Arizona fails to address its Latino educational attainment gap. The publication is more of an economic impact statement than an education report, with indicators pointing out consequences and contributions, depending on action or inaction in closing the gap of Arizona's future workforce.

The biggest economic trend in Arizona over the last decade has been the flat line on various measures of prosperity relative to the national average. Arizona always has been below the national average on measures such as the average wage, earnings per employee, and per capita personal income. However, Arizona compares less favorably now than it did in the 1970s and early 1980s.

The economic underpinnings in Arizona of housing, employment, and financial services have collapsed, as they have almost everywhere else around the nation, albeit deeper here than in most other states. Arizona again must have the wisdom and willpower to rebound. But it will take more than a bold vision, although one is needed. It will take follow-through and collaboration – neither of which have been Arizona’s strong suit in recent years – as well as informed public policy based on what we’ve learned from the past, melded with what we already know about the future. In short, Arizona must prepare itself for the next economy.

Though the Great Recession may be officially over, all is not well in Arizona. Three years after the collapse of a massive real estate “bubble,” the deepest economic downturn in memory exposed and exacerbated one of the nation’s most profound state fiscal crises, with disturbing implications for Arizona citizens and the state’s long-term economic health.

This brief takes a careful look at the Grand Canyon State’s fiscal situation, examining both Arizona’s serious cyclical budget shortfall—the one resulting from a temporary collapse of revenue due to the recession—as well as the chronic, longer-term, and massive structural imbalances that have developed largely due to policy choices made in better times. This primer employs a unique methodology to estimate the size of the state’s structural deficit and then explores the mix of forces, including the large permanent tax reductions, that created them. It also highlights some of the dramatic impacts these fiscal challenges are having on service-delivery as well as on local governments. The brief suggests some of the steps state policymakers must take to close their budget gaps over the short and longer term. First, it urges better policymaking, and prods leaders to broaden, balance, and diversify the state’s revenue base while looking to assure a long-haul balance of taxing and spending. And second, it recommends that Arizona improve the information-sharing and budgeting processes through which fiscal problems are understood—so they may ultimately be averted.

Building upon the work of many others who have contributed to quality of life research in Arizona, this report provides a framework for addressing key issues proactively. The data in Arizona Directions are presented in a highly graphic format with must-read information on our competitiveness, individual action steps, opportunities for public-private partnerships, and public policy options – all rooted in a deep understanding that revenue-neutral options are especially important in our current fiscal situation.

This paper, drawing upon historical data and information from surveys and interviews with more than 50 legislators, lobbyists, and knowledgeable observers, finds that the term limits reform adopted by the Arizona voters in 1992 has caused legislators to make some painful adjustments. Because of term limits many legislators have decided to run for another office prior to the expiration of their terms. This has often meant trying to move from the one legislative house to another, most commonly from the House to the Senate. On the plus side, the report finds that term limits have encouraged greater competition for legislative and other seats and have given voters a greater choice among candidates. To some extent, limits have been a force toward a more inclusive governing process. At the same time, they have generally reduced the power of legislative leaders and generally increased the influence of lobbyists and staff, though not all lobbyists and staff have gained equally. Recent newcomers to the Arizona Legislature are probably not any less knowledgeable than previous classes of newcomers, but under term limits there are more newcomers and members have less time to learn their jobs. For many, the limit to four two-year terms (eight years total) provides too little time to learn how to do the job and do it well.