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Created2003 to 2012
Description

The Arizona Department of Transportation, the Arizona Game & Fish Department and the Arizona State Parks Board are required to conduct a study every three years on watercraft fuel consumption and recreational watercraft usage. The fuel consumption data is collected to determine the allocation of motor vehicle fuel tax to

The Arizona Department of Transportation, the Arizona Game & Fish Department and the Arizona State Parks Board are required to conduct a study every three years on watercraft fuel consumption and recreational watercraft usage. The fuel consumption data is collected to determine the allocation of motor vehicle fuel tax to the State Lake Improvement Fund. The information on recreational watercraft usage patterns on Arizona’s lakes and rivers is necessary, in part, to determine the distribution of SLIF funds to applicants.

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ContributorsRiordan, M. J. (Author)
Created1924-03-07
Description

Letter from Michael J. Reardon to Carl T. Hayden, in agreement with Ralph Cameron, asserting that Bright Angel Trail should not be sold from Coconino County to the United States.

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ContributorsHayden, Carl T. (Author)
Created1924-03-13
Description

Letter from Carl T. Hayden to Michael J. Riordan explaining the benefits of selling Bright Angel Trail and building an approach road.

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Created2004-08-05
Description

Supermarket retailers make strategic pricing decisions in a high-frequency, repeated game environment both in buying and selling fresh produce. In this context, there is some question as to whether a non-cooperative equilibrium can emerge that produces margins above the competitive level. Supermarket pricing results from tacitly collusive equilibria supported by

Supermarket retailers make strategic pricing decisions in a high-frequency, repeated game environment both in buying and selling fresh produce. In this context, there is some question as to whether a non-cooperative equilibrium can emerge that produces margins above the competitive level. Supermarket pricing results from tacitly collusive equilibria supported by trigger price strategies played in upstream markets. Upstream activities are, in turn, driven by periodic retail price promotions. We test this hypothesis using a sample of fresh produce pricing data from 20 supermarket chains in markets distributed throughout the U.S. Our results support the existence of tacitly collusive non-cooperative equilibria in upstream and downstream markets.

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Created2004
Description

Supermarkets use periodic price promotions, or “sales” on a regular basis for a variety of products. Relatively little is understood about why supermarkets promote perishable items such as fresh fruits and vegetables, dairy products or meat. The primary contribution of this paper lies in demonstrating that sales among perishable food

Supermarkets use periodic price promotions, or “sales” on a regular basis for a variety of products. Relatively little is understood about why supermarkets promote perishable items such as fresh fruits and vegetables, dairy products or meat. The primary contribution of this paper lies in demonstrating that sales among perishable food items are mixed-strategy equilibria among multi-product retailers in which managers choose both the size of the promotion and the number of products to promote.

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ContributorsPalgen-Maissoneuve, Mimi, 1918-1995 (Photographer)
Created1942 to 1962
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ContributorsPalgen-Maissoneuve, Mimi, 1918-1995 (Photographer)
Created1942 to 1962
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ContributorsPalgen-Maissoneuve, Mimi, 1918-1995 (Photographer)
Created1942 to 1962
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ContributorsPalgen-Maissoneuve, Mimi, 1918-1995 (Photographer)
Created1942 to 1962
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ContributorsPalgen-Maissoneuve, Mimi, 1918-1995 (Photographer)
Created1942 to 1962