This manuscript discusses the ongoing debate surrounding the involvement of the Canadian Wheat Board in international trade. The paper outlines a simple test of the ability of the CWB to price discriminate among export markets for the 1980/81 to 1994/95 period. The study finds evidence of the ability of the CWB to price discriminate. It also shows that the magnitude and significance of price discrimination increased during the operation of the U.S. Export Enhancement Program from 1985/86 to 1994/95.

We compare the current Canadian Supply Management regime in which producers and importers benefit from rent-seeking activities that set production quota and import quota levels with those under a tariff, in which producers partakes in rent-seeking activities in order to induce the government to introduce a favorable tariff regime. We explore three different quota-setting games: (1) the import quota and production quota are set at a level that arises from a Cournot-Nash equilibrium between producers and importers; (2) the producer marketing board acts as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account the importers’ reaction to its production quota level; and (3) the importer behaves as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account producers’ reaction to its import quota level. We compare these quota-setting games with two different tariff-setting games: (1) A non-cooperative game in which the government sets the tariff at a level that maximizes tariff revenue; and (2) A cooperative game in which producers, through rent-seeking activities, induce the government to set the tariff at a level that maximizes joint government and producer rents.