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Created2004-08-05
Description

Supermarket retailers make strategic pricing decisions in a high-frequency, repeated game environment both in buying and selling fresh produce. In this context, there is some question as to whether a non-cooperative equilibrium can emerge that produces margins above the competitive level. Supermarket pricing results from tacitly collusive equilibria supported by

Supermarket retailers make strategic pricing decisions in a high-frequency, repeated game environment both in buying and selling fresh produce. In this context, there is some question as to whether a non-cooperative equilibrium can emerge that produces margins above the competitive level. Supermarket pricing results from tacitly collusive equilibria supported by trigger price strategies played in upstream markets. Upstream activities are, in turn, driven by periodic retail price promotions. We test this hypothesis using a sample of fresh produce pricing data from 20 supermarket chains in markets distributed throughout the U.S. Our results support the existence of tacitly collusive non-cooperative equilibria in upstream and downstream markets.

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Created2004-07
Description

Product-line length, or variety, is a key competitive tool used by retailers to differentiate themselves from rivals. Theoretical models of price and variety competition suggest that both store and product heterogeneity are key determinants of price and variety strategies, but none test this hypothesis in a rigorous way. This study

Product-line length, or variety, is a key competitive tool used by retailers to differentiate themselves from rivals. Theoretical models of price and variety competition suggest that both store and product heterogeneity are key determinants of price and variety strategies, but none test this hypothesis in a rigorous way. This study provides the first empirical evidence on supermarket retailers’ combined price and variety strategies using a nested CES modeling framework. Unlike other discrete-choice models of product differentiation, the NCES model is sufficiently general to admit both corner and interior solutions in both store and product choice. The model is estimated using store-level scanner data for all grocery chains in a major West Coast market and finds that retailers do indeed use both price and product-line strategies to compete for market share, but tend to follow moderately cooperative pricing strategies and price and more cooperative strategies in variety.

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ContributorsPalgen-Maissoneuve, Mimi, 1918-1995 (Photographer)
Created1942 to 1962