Morrison Institute for Public Policy Publications Archives

The author writes about Arizona's longstanding belief in direct democracy via referendum, initiative and recall. The Legislature continues to grapple with election reform and strike a balance of how much binding authority should remain in the hands of voters in terms of initiative, referendum and recall, but Arizona’s penchant for people power has been demonstrated since before statehood. In the midst of his campaign for Congress in 1911, for example, Arizona’s Carl Hayden noted that everywhere he went he found voters eager to take control. "The people want their own kind of government,” Hayden told reporters. “They want to be the dictators.”

Since statehood in 1912, Arizona has been among the nation’s leaders in using the initiative process to either adopt a statute or amend the state constitution by placing a measure on the ballot. But such efforts are anything but easy. In fact, organizers have found it to be an expensive, time-consuming and exhausting process – and one that is unlikely to end successfully.

Public finance—taxes and other revenues collected by government and the expenditure of those revenues—always has been somewhat controversial because of wide philosophical differences among residents regarding the role that government should play in providing public services and in collecting taxes and fees from its residents. Recently, public finance in Arizona has become a prominent public issue due to the need to resolve the deficits that afflict state government and most county and municipal governments in Arizona.

State trust lands are among the greatest public assets in Arizona’s portfolio. Set aside at statehood, the Arizona State Land Department manages more than 9 million acres of trust lands on behalf of 14 beneficiaries. The largest of which by far is Arizona Public Education K through 12.The mission of the Land Department is to maximize revenues from these trust lands. In FY 2005, state trust lands generated $115 million for all beneficiaries, of which $101 million was designated to support public K-12 schools.These amounts are increasing rapidly as more state trust land becomes attractive for development in Arizona’s urban areas.

The parcel discussed in this report, “Superstition Vistas,” stands out as the jewel among Arizona’s trust lands. Not only is it situated in the path of metro Phoenix growth, but it also borders thousands of acres of public land managed by the Tonto National Forest and U.S. Bureau of Land Management. Estimates of its total value run well into the billions of dollars.

"The Treasure of the Superstitions" sets the stage for a continuing dialogue about the potential for Superstition Vistas, and indeed, all of Arizona’s trust lands. We look forward to listening to and working with our beneficiaries, citizens, counties, municipalities, real estate businesses, and other interested parties to make the most of Arizona’s “treasure.”

This paper, drawing upon historical data and information from surveys and interviews with more than 50 legislators, lobbyists, and knowledgeable observers, finds that the term limits reform adopted by the Arizona voters in 1992 has caused legislators to make some painful adjustments. Because of term limits many legislators have decided to run for another office prior to the expiration of their terms. This has often meant trying to move from the one legislative house to another, most commonly from the House to the Senate. On the plus side, the report finds that term limits have encouraged greater competition for legislative and other seats and have given voters a greater choice among candidates. To some extent, limits have been a force toward a more inclusive governing process. At the same time, they have generally reduced the power of legislative leaders and generally increased the influence of lobbyists and staff, though not all lobbyists and staff have gained equally. Recent newcomers to the Arizona Legislature are probably not any less knowledgeable than previous classes of newcomers, but under term limits there are more newcomers and members have less time to learn their jobs. For many, the limit to four two-year terms (eight years total) provides too little time to learn how to do the job and do it well.

Four major statewide "tools" to help manage growth and preserve open space have been put to work in Arizona over the past five years. These include the Arizona Preserve Initiative and the closely-related Proposition 303, as well as the Growing Smarter Act and its "addendum," Growing Smarter Plus. All four tools are based in large part on a concept known as "smart growth," which is generally considered to be a set of growth management measures that attempt to strike a balance among issues of economics, environment, and quality of life. Taken together, these four growth management tools make significant changes in the way that (a) city and county governments plan and regulate their lands, (b) citizens play a role in land use issues, (c) state trust lands are managed, and (d) open space may be acquired and preserved. Many of these changes will have long-term effects for the state. This paper provides a brief overview of each of the four growth management/open space tools, a preliminary accounting of major activities each one has stimulated, and a perspective on what can be expected for the future as expressed by a selection of growth planners and other leaders of growth management in Arizona.

Arizona is emerging from one of the worst state budget crises in the nation. Entering 2003, its projected deficit, measured as a percentage of the general fund, was the fifth largest in the country.1 The state had slashed spending in 2002 in the face of a $900 million deficit, but still faced a $400 million shortfall for fiscal year 2003 and an estimated $1 billion deficit in fiscal 2004. Although improved revenues have reduced the anticipated gap, fundamental underlying problems remain concerning the ability of lawmakers to control the budget. Some observers consider this a revenue problem, others a spending problem. Our concern in this paper is whether state lawmakers have enough control over either revenue or spending.