Arizona State and Local Government Documents Collection
The State and Local Arizona Documents (SALAD) collection contains documents published by the State of Arizona, its Counties, incorporated Cities or Towns, or affiliated Councils of Government; documents produced under the auspices of a state or local agency, board, commission or department, including reports made to these units; and Salt River Project, a licensed municipality. ASU is a primary collector of state publications and makes a concerted effort to acquire and catalog most materials published by state and local governmental agencies.
The ASU Digital Repository provides access to digital SALAD publications, however the ASU Libraries’ non-digitized Arizona documents can be searched through the ASU Libraries Catalog. For additional assistance, Ask A Government Documents Librarian.
Publications issued by the Morrison Institute for Public Programs at Arizona State University are also available in PRISM, in the Morrison Institute for Public Policy - Publications Archive collection.
Filtering by
- Creators: Arizona. Highway Department
- Creators: Schmitz, Andrew
- Resource Type: Text
The theory of factor market distortions deals largely with taxing inputs. However, input subsidies are not only common in manufacturing. For example, U.S. agriculture is heavily dependent on input subsidies.
If water subsidies in the production of California cotton were removed, along with commodity payments, production of cotton in California would likely cease. Likewise, transportation subsidies were common in both the U.S. and Canada, and still prevail in the U.S.
We compare the current Canadian Supply Management regime in which producers and importers benefit from rent-seeking activities that set production quota and import quota levels with those under a tariff, in which producers partakes in rent-seeking activities in order to induce the government to introduce a favorable tariff regime. We explore three different quota-setting games: (1) the import quota and production quota are set at a level that arises from a Cournot-Nash equilibrium between producers and importers; (2) the producer marketing board acts as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account the importers’ reaction to its production quota level; and (3) the importer behaves as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account producers’ reaction to its import quota level. We compare these quota-setting games with two different tariff-setting games: (1) A non-cooperative game in which the government sets the tariff at a level that maximizes tariff revenue; and (2) A cooperative game in which producers, through rent-seeking activities, induce the government to set the tariff at a level that maximizes joint government and producer rents.