Arizona State and Local Government Documents Collection

This document is intended to give an overview of the Federal-Aid Program and its impacts on Arizona. There are four major sections in the report: (1) Overview of the Federal-Aid Program; (2) Arizona Federal funding highlights for the fiscal year; (3) Federal-aid Highway Program Characteristics; and (4) Federal-Aid Highway Program descriptions. The first section gives a general overview of how the Federal-Aid Program is financed, the authorization process and a discussion of the apportionment, allocation and obligation authority processes. The second section deals with Arizona Federal funding highlights the for fiscal year. The last two sections are devoted to characteristics of the core programs, including eligibility, limitations, apportionment formulas and descriptions of the funding categories.

Since 1986, the Arizona Department of Transportation has used a comprehensive regression-based econometric model to estimate Transportation Excise Tax revenues for Maricopa County. These revenues, which flow into the Regional Area Road Fund (RARF), are the major funding source for the Maricopa County Freeway Program. This document contains the official forecast of expected values for the Maricopa County Transportation Excise Tax as developed by the Arizona Department of Transportation in cooperation with the Maricopa Association of Governments, Valley Metro and Valley Metro Rail.

The Maricopa County Transportation Excise Tax, often referred to as the “1/2 cent sales tax” is levied upon business activities in Maricopa County, including retail sales, contracting, utilities, rental of real and personal property, restaurant and bar receipts, and other activities. Transportation excise tax revenues are deposited in the Maricopa County Regional Area Road Fund (RARF) which is administered by the Arizona Department of Transportation. These revenues were the principal source of funding for the Regional Freeway System in Maricopa County and were dedicated by statute to the purchase of right-of-way, design and construction of new freeways, widening of existing freeways and highways, improvements to the arterial street system, regional bus service and high capacity transit services such as light rail.

The State of Arizona taxes motor fuels and collects a variety of fees relating to the registration and operation of motor vehicles in the state. These collections include gasoline and use fuel taxes, motor carrier fees, vehicle license taxes, motor vehicle registration fees, and other miscellaneous fees. These revenues are deposited in the Arizona Highway User Revenue Fund and are then distributed to the cities, towns and counties of the State and to the State Highway Fund, which is administered by the Department. These taxes and fees represent a source of revenues available to the state for highway related expenses.

The State of Arizona taxes motor fuels and collects fees relating to the registration and operation of motor vehicles. These taxes and fees include gasoline and use fuel taxes, motor carrier fees, motor vehicle registration fees, vehicle license taxes, and other miscellaneous fees. Revenues are deposited in the Arizona Highway User Revenue Fund and are then distributed to the cities, towns and counties and to the State Highway Fund. These taxes and fees are a major source of revenue to the state for highway construction, improvements, and other related expenditures.

The theory of factor market distortions deals largely with taxing inputs. However, input subsidies are not only common in manufacturing. For example, U.S. agriculture is heavily dependent on input subsidies.
If water subsidies in the production of California cotton were removed, along with commodity payments, production of cotton in California would likely cease. Likewise, transportation subsidies were common in both the U.S. and Canada, and still prevail in the U.S.

The economic theories of New Institutional Economics, auctions, and welfare economics are used to analyze the potential for E-Commerce as an institution within the agricultural sector. We discuss the theory of the firm within the NIE paradigm and focus on the potential for E-Commerce to reduce transaction costs, search costs, and the costs associated with buying and selling livestock under various auction formats. We develop a theoretical model that captures the effect of Internet feeder-cattle auctions on Florida’s cattle market at three different levels in the marketing channel. We discuss the institutional arrangements and marketing mechanisms associated with the marketing of stocker and feeder cattle in Florida. We present the results of a survey distributed to cattle producers in North Florida regarding herd size, direct transaction costs of marketing cattle, and the implications of internet technology. Finally, we perform an empirical welfare analysis in order to estimate the impact of reduced transaction costs associated with Internet and video livestock auctions on cow-calf operators and backgrounders in Florida.

We investigate the underlying reasons for producers’ choice of marketing channels for stocker cattle in the United States. In addition to traditional public auctions, private sales, video auctions, and Internet auctions have been recently used in the marketing of stocker cattle. We find that while the number of marketing options may have increased in recent years, only relatively large producers can actually take advantage of these options. The marketing options for smaller producers are still limited due to their relative size. We also find that the number of cattle marketed privately and through video and Internet auctions is positively correlated with herd size. In addition, the New Institutional Economics provides insights into how herd size influences the choice of marketing channels.

We compare the current Canadian Supply Management regime in which producers and importers benefit from rent-seeking activities that set production quota and import quota levels with those under a tariff, in which producers partakes in rent-seeking activities in order to induce the government to introduce a favorable tariff regime. We explore three different quota-setting games: (1) the import quota and production quota are set at a level that arises from a Cournot-Nash equilibrium between producers and importers; (2) the producer marketing board acts as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account the importers’ reaction to its production quota level; and (3) the importer behaves as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account producers’ reaction to its import quota level. We compare these quota-setting games with two different tariff-setting games: (1) A non-cooperative game in which the government sets the tariff at a level that maximizes tariff revenue; and (2) A cooperative game in which producers, through rent-seeking activities, induce the government to set the tariff at a level that maximizes joint government and producer rents.