Arizona State and Local Government Documents Collection

The Arizona Department of Public Safety enforces state law with primary responsibility in the areas of motor vehicle traffic, narcotics, organized crime/racketeering, and specific regulatory functions. Operational and technical assistance is provided to local and state government agencies and other components of the criminal justice community. Services include scientific analysis, aircraft support, emergency first care, criminal information systems, and statewide communications. The Department also promotes and enhances the quality of public safety through cooperative enforcement operations and by increasing public awareness of criminal activities.

The Arizona Department of Public Safety became operational by the executive order of Governor Jack Williams on July 1, 1969. Governor Williams’ mandate consolidated the functions and responsibilities of the Arizona Highway Patrol, the Enforcement Division of the State Department of Liquor Licenses and Control and the Narcotics Division of the State Department of Law.

Realizing the need for drought preparedness in Arizona, a Governor’s Drought Task Force was created in 2003 and the Arizona Drought Preparedness Plan developed. The plan was adopted in 2004 and its continued implementation ordered in 2007. It established a framework to monitor drought, improve understanding of drought impacts, and determine mechanisms for limiting future vulnerability. The Arizona Department of Water Resources coordinates these activities and prepares the Arizona Drought Preparedness Annual Report each year.

The Arizona Department of Water Resources manages the state’s water supply. Water management includes a wide variety of activities that are intended to protect and preserve the water supply. Examples of these activities include licensing well drillers, assuring the safety of dams, and developing mandatory conservation requirements for all water use sectors in Active Management Areas, protecting the state’s Colorado River allocation and facilitating Indian water rights negotiations among tribal representatives, local interests, federal and state officials and members of Congress.

On March 20, 2003, Governor Janet Napolitano established the Governor’s Drought Task Force to address the drought issues facing all Arizonans. The Task Force made several recommendations, documented in the "Arizona Drought Preparedness Plan", including that the Governor seek legislative authority for the Arizona Department of Water Resources to require water systems to develop a drought plan. The plan would include mitigation strategies, including a water conservation plan to reduce vulnerability to drought and plan for drought response actions. In addition, the Governor’s Drought Task Force recommended legislative authorization for ADWR to require all water systems to provide consistent and coordinated water supply information to ADWR. The Arizona Legislature passed House Bill 2277 during the 2005 legislative session, creating a requirement for community water systems to develop and submit a System Water Plan to ADWR. The development of these plans is an important step toward improving water resource management planning at both the state and local levels. They will enable the state to identify data gaps and gather much needed information.

In 2001, ADWR undertook a review of the Upper San Pedro Basin to determine if it met the statutory requirements for designation as an AMA. This report reviews the water supply and demand of the USP Basin in the context of the statutory criteria and includes a discussion of whether any of the criteria have been met. Previously, ADWR conducted a study of the USP Basin and issued a report in 1988 in which ADWR determined that the Basin did not meet the statutory criteria for AMA designation. ADWR indicated in the report that it would reassess conditions in the Basin in ten to fifteen years. The study described in this report is an evaluation of whether the conditions of the USP Basin satisfy the statutory criteria. This report contains a description of the current and projected water resources and water demand in the Basin, incorporating new information since the previous review. The report examines historic water use trends, evaluates the groundwater resources of the Basin, and projects impacts of future water use on Basin groundwater supplies. The report includes an evaluation of the incidence of subsidence or fissuring, and of the potential for groundwater quality degradation due to groundwater use. The report further describes and evaluates the impact that AMA practices would have on water use, and includes a summary of findings, the director’s determination of whether the Basin should be designated and recommendations.

The theory of factor market distortions deals largely with taxing inputs. However, input subsidies are not only common in manufacturing. For example, U.S. agriculture is heavily dependent on input subsidies.
If water subsidies in the production of California cotton were removed, along with commodity payments, production of cotton in California would likely cease. Likewise, transportation subsidies were common in both the U.S. and Canada, and still prevail in the U.S.

We compare the current Canadian Supply Management regime in which producers and importers benefit from rent-seeking activities that set production quota and import quota levels with those under a tariff, in which producers partakes in rent-seeking activities in order to induce the government to introduce a favorable tariff regime. We explore three different quota-setting games: (1) the import quota and production quota are set at a level that arises from a Cournot-Nash equilibrium between producers and importers; (2) the producer marketing board acts as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account the importers’ reaction to its production quota level; and (3) the importer behaves as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account producers’ reaction to its import quota level. We compare these quota-setting games with two different tariff-setting games: (1) A non-cooperative game in which the government sets the tariff at a level that maximizes tariff revenue; and (2) A cooperative game in which producers, through rent-seeking activities, induce the government to set the tariff at a level that maximizes joint government and producer rents.