Arizona State and Local Government Documents Collection

The travel and tourism industry matters to Arizona’s economic health and vitality.  As one of Arizona’s pillar industries, tourism has been integral to the economic growth and development of the Grand Canyon State shaping it into the amazing destination that it is today. This industry has generated thousands of jobs, billions of dollars in earnings and billions of dollars in tax revenue, all of which contribute to the quality of life for each and every Arizonan.

Arizona’s travel and tourism industry is operating in a new landscape driven by sustained economic challenges, evolving demographics, emerging technology and shifts in consumer travel patterns. Thus the creation and importance of its 5-Year Strategic Plan is to lay the foundation upon which our agency will take the lead and assist in the continued growth and prosperity of our industry over the next five years, further contributing to the overall economic development of the state.

The theory of factor market distortions deals largely with taxing inputs. However, input subsidies are not only common in manufacturing. For example, U.S. agriculture is heavily dependent on input subsidies.
If water subsidies in the production of California cotton were removed, along with commodity payments, production of cotton in California would likely cease. Likewise, transportation subsidies were common in both the U.S. and Canada, and still prevail in the U.S.

The economic theories of New Institutional Economics, auctions, and welfare economics are used to analyze the potential for E-Commerce as an institution within the agricultural sector. We discuss the theory of the firm within the NIE paradigm and focus on the potential for E-Commerce to reduce transaction costs, search costs, and the costs associated with buying and selling livestock under various auction formats. We develop a theoretical model that captures the effect of Internet feeder-cattle auctions on Florida’s cattle market at three different levels in the marketing channel. We discuss the institutional arrangements and marketing mechanisms associated with the marketing of stocker and feeder cattle in Florida. We present the results of a survey distributed to cattle producers in North Florida regarding herd size, direct transaction costs of marketing cattle, and the implications of internet technology. Finally, we perform an empirical welfare analysis in order to estimate the impact of reduced transaction costs associated with Internet and video livestock auctions on cow-calf operators and backgrounders in Florida.

We investigate the underlying reasons for producers’ choice of marketing channels for stocker cattle in the United States. In addition to traditional public auctions, private sales, video auctions, and Internet auctions have been recently used in the marketing of stocker cattle. We find that while the number of marketing options may have increased in recent years, only relatively large producers can actually take advantage of these options. The marketing options for smaller producers are still limited due to their relative size. We also find that the number of cattle marketed privately and through video and Internet auctions is positively correlated with herd size. In addition, the New Institutional Economics provides insights into how herd size influences the choice of marketing channels.

We compare the current Canadian Supply Management regime in which producers and importers benefit from rent-seeking activities that set production quota and import quota levels with those under a tariff, in which producers partakes in rent-seeking activities in order to induce the government to introduce a favorable tariff regime. We explore three different quota-setting games: (1) the import quota and production quota are set at a level that arises from a Cournot-Nash equilibrium between producers and importers; (2) the producer marketing board acts as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account the importers’ reaction to its production quota level; and (3) the importer behaves as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account producers’ reaction to its import quota level. We compare these quota-setting games with two different tariff-setting games: (1) A non-cooperative game in which the government sets the tariff at a level that maximizes tariff revenue; and (2) A cooperative game in which producers, through rent-seeking activities, induce the government to set the tariff at a level that maximizes joint government and producer rents.